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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

Plaintiff-ll es po11de 11t,

vs.

~
(

KENT .M. KIRKMAN,

Case No.
1078:3

)

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant appeals his conviction for burglary in
the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN LO,iVER COURT
Appellant was charged by information with the crime
of burglary in the second degree. Jury was had in the
Second Judicial District Court in and for the County of
Davis, State of Utah, on September 20, 1966. The jury
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returned a verdict of guilty as charged, and the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, judge, imposed sentence upon
the appellant of confinement for the indeterminate
period provided by law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the conviction should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent is in agreement with appellant's statement of facts with the addition and clarification of these
following particulars: Prior to the time when Officer
Ehlers arrived on the scene, John Dinse and his wife,
Laola Dinse, had observed the truck which the defendants occupied, pull into the driveway of their business
establishment directly across the street from the Bountiful City Water Shops (Tr. 52, 25). They then observed the truck back out of the driveway and proceed
north up the street past the Bountiful City Water
Shops (Tr. 39, 52). They further observed the truck
to drive up and down the street two or three times with
the headlights off (Tr. 53, 30). Laola Dinse next
observed the truck drive up and over the curb and park
very near to the Bountiful City Water Shops (Tr.
53). Laola Dinse made the additional observation
that the defendants seemed to be hooking something
with a chain and trying to drag it. (Tr. 32).
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The facts of appellant's brief correctly state that
a window leading into the rest room of the Bountiful
City \Vater Shops was found open. However, it is
significant that through said rest room, entrance may
be gained to the main parking area wherein truck No.
3 owned by the Bountiful City vVater Company was
parked on the evening of April 5, 1966 (Tr. 63). A
wrench properly identified in the evidence as that
belonging in the tool compartment of truck No. 3 was
found in the front seat of the truck occupied by the
defendant on the evening of April 5, 1966 (Tr. 39).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF BURGLARY
IN THE SECOND DEGREE.
Appellant has been convicted of burglary in the
second degree. The elements of said crime are stated
in Utah Code Ann. ~ 76-9-3 (1953). The statute, in
part, provides:
Every person who, in the nighttime,
enters an open door, window, or other
apertureof any house ... or other building ... with intent to commit larcency or
any felony, is guilty of burglary in the
second degree.
Thus it is clear that the State need put on suffi<'ient evidence only to prove these things: That the
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accused entered a building; that the accused entered
during the nighttime; that the accused entered with the
intent to commit a felony. Respondent submits that
the evidence clearly shows sufficient facts from which
the jury could reasonably find that all of the elements
of the crime were present.
It is clear from the direct evidence in this case
that appellant and another, not involved in this prosecution, drove by the Bountiful City '¥ater Sheds a
number of times with their lights off. Apparently
they were "casing" the building upon which they had
designs. After a number of times up and down the
street, they decided that the coast was clear, drove up
and over the curb, and parked the truck next to a window in the Bountiful City Water Sheds. The men
then got out of the truck. There follows a period of
perhaps ten minutes wherein there is no direct evidence
as to the activities of the defendant. However, they
were next observed by both Mrs. Dinse and Officer
Ehlers to be standing outside of the truck. Also, Officer
Ehlers observed a wrench belonging to the Bountiful
City Water Company in the front seat of the truck
occupied by defendant. This wrench was supposed to
be not in the seat of defendant's truck, but in the tool
compartment of the truck owned by the Bountiful
City Water Company, which truck: was at the time
inside the building in question. The way to the parking area where the truck was kept was readily accessible through the open window in the building.
However, it can be reasonably inferred that since the
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defendant and his companion were working on the
outside gate at the time they were apprehended, that
they not only wanted to get themselves inside the
building, which they could do and the jury believed
they had done via the window access route, but they
also wanted to get their truck inside the gate and inside the building. For this they came well prepared.
They had bolt cutters, crow bar, and a pry bar in the
back of the truck. Some of these tools were being used
at the time they were apprehended or had been used
immediately preceding their apprenhension in an attempt to open the gate through which their truck could
be admitted.
Respondent agrees with appellant that the most
damaging evidence adduced in this case was the wrench
belonging to the Bountiful City Water Company and
found in possession of appellant. This evidence gives
rise to the strong inference that appellant did, in fact,
enter the building and would suffice to supply the
necessary element of entry. As was stated in State v.
Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 315, 392 P.2d 486, 488 (1964)
"The jury can find not only the facts shown directly
by the evidence, but also such additional facts as may
reasonably be inferred therefrom." Thus, that the
building was entered would hardly admit of argument.
It is submitted that the foregoing detailed circumstances would also suffice to allow the jury to return
a finding which would include a determination that
the defendant intended to commit a felony inside the
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building. As was said in State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah
2d 363, 365, 359 P.2d 486, 488, ( 1961) :

It is to be remembered that intent, being a state of mind, is rarely susceptible
of direct proof. But it can be inferred
from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of human behavior
and experienc~. It is upon that basis that
authorities uniformly affirm that where
one breaks and enters into the dwelling of
another in the nighttime, without the latter's consent, an inference may be drawn
that he did so to commit larceny.
When the facts have been properly presented to
the jury, great weight is given to the properiety of
the verdict returned thereon. Thus, when the jury
finds the fact as such and there is a reasonable basis
from which they can draw the requisite inferences,
the decision will stand. State v. '1 1ellay, 7 Utah 2d 308,
324 P.2d 490 (1958); State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d
no, 307 P.2d 212 (1957), cert. den.; Sullivan v. Utah,
355 U.S. 848 (1957). Thus it is clear that from the
foregoing circumstances, the jury was entirely within
its prerogative to find the facts and return a verdict
of guilty thereon.
Moreover, that the presence of the wrench iu the
truck was strongly inferential of what had taken place
can hardly be disputed. Some jurisdictions will convict
on that evidence alone; that is, the unexplained possession of stolen property alone is sufficient to co11Yid
in certain instances. Rueda v. People, 141 Colo. 50"1!,
6

348 P.2d 958 ( 1960) ; Davis v. People, 137 Colo. 113,
321 P.2d 1103 ( 1958). However, the rule that is adopted in most of our sister states, and which apparently
is prevailing in Utah, is that the unexplained possession of articles recently stolen coupled with other
incriminating circumstances, will be sufficient to support the jury's verdict of guilty. State v. Washington,
13 Utah 2d 92, 368 P.2d 709 (1962); People v. Conerly, 172 C.A.2d 682, 342 P.2d 305 (1959), cert.
den., 362 U.S. 924 ( 1959); State v. Andrade, 83 Ariz.
356, 321 P.2d 1021 ( 1958); State v. Thomas, 121
Utah 639, 244 P.2d 653 (1952); State v. Deeds,
126 ~1ont. 38, 243 P.2d 314 (1952); Rogers v. State,
85 Okla. Crim. 116, l 85 P.2d 927 ( 1947).
As was said in State v. Thomas, supra, at 641, 244
P.2d 654:

vV e recognize the correctness of the defendant's assertion that mere possession
of recently stolen property, if not coupled
with other inculpatory or incriminating
circumstances would not justify submission ot' the case to the jury and would not
be sufficieut to support a conviction. . . .
Conversely, however,, possession of articles rece~1tlv stolen, when coupled with
circumstance.s inconsistent with innocensc .... ma v he sufficient to connect the
possessor with the offense of burglary and
justify his conviction of it.
Respowk11t submits that such is the case with the
fads as shown by the record herein. There is direct
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evidence that the defendant had in his possession property rightfully belonging to the Bountiful City 'Vater
Department. There is additional evidence strongly
tending to show incriminating and inculpatory action
on the part of the defendant on the night in question.
In light of these facts clearly established by the record, respondent submits that the jury had adequate
evidence to consider, and its findings of guilty were
properly supported.
POINT II.
THE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
WERE PROPER AND ADEQUATE IN THE
PREMISES SINCE:
A. THE INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED
AND GIVEN PROPERLY INCLUDED
ALL OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF THE CRIME.
B. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION
WHICH WAS NOT REQUESTED.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF RECENT POSSESSION IS A STATUTORY DOCTRINE
CONCERNED WITH THE PROSECUTION !<-.OR LARCENY, NOT SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY.
A. It is a well settled rule that the instructions
are to be considered together as a whole, and are not
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to be taken independently or singularly. In fact, the
court in this case did so instruct (Tr. 90). With this
in mind, it is clearly apparent that all of the elements
of the offense 'vere properly placed before the jury
via the instructions. Instruction No. I puts forth all
of the essential elements upon which the jury must
decide to make a conviction in this case (Tr 84). Instruction No. 2 is an admonition to the jury that Instruction No. I is not a statement of facts but is a
statement of what must be found by the jury in order
to make a conviction. (Tr. 84). Instruction No. 3
clearly would tell the jury that they must find sufficient evidence to prove each of the essential allegations incorporated by the first two instructions (Tr.
85) . And then Instruction No. 4 clearly charges the
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that all of
the facts alleged in Instruction No. I did exist in this
case (Tr. 85).
Thus, when all of the instructions given in this
case are taken as a whole, it becomes clearly apparent
that the jury had before them the charge of finding
the necessary elements of the crin1e. Further, in returning a verdict of guilty as charged, the jury satisfactorily considered each and all of the essential ellegations.
B. This court has held that unless a party requests
i11struction on special matters he cannot predicate
error on the court's failure to charge. State v. Rowley,
15 Utah 2d 4<, asG P.2d 126 (1963). Defendant did
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not request an instruction on recent possession at the
trial. Nor was there any objection made to the failure
to so instruct at the trial. Appellant admits in his brief
that the instruction was not requested by defendant
(Brief of Appellant, page 13). Respondent submits
that the defendant cannot now complain to this court
that the failure was prejudicial to him. Yet appellant
would urge that it is the court's duty to make instructions that are not requested by either side. By this
unique argument, defense counsel could in many instances assure themselves of a reversal on appeal
merely by failing to request a necessary instruction
hoping that the court might overlook the instruction
and fail to give it. Respondent submits that this
method, which would allow the defendant by his own
doing to set himself up an almost assured reversal on
appeal, is wholly inconsistent with our system of justice. It is submitted that our system of justice will
not tolerate a defendant purposely planting a flaw at
trial in the hope of gaining a reversal on appeal.
I-lad defendant, at trial, requested an instruction
on recent possession, and the court refused to give such
an instruction, the case would be different. Under the
facts here, however, the appellant should not be allowed to profit from his own wrong doing. Thus, the
failure to give such an instruction in no way prejudiced
appellant.
C. Appellant urges that the doctrine of recent
possession is a material element in the crime of seeoud
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degree burglary and cites Utah Code Ann. § 76-33-1
( 1953), as authority for such statement. The respondent submits that appellant misconstrues this section.
The section above referenced refers to larceny prosecutions. Had appellant been charged with larceny, a
failure to instruct on all of the statutory elements of
larceny may indeed have been prejudicial. However,
we are here concerned with a conviction on the charge
of second degree burglary. Respondent does not deny
that the possession of the recently stolen property by
defendant was considered by the jury. Indeed, strong
inferences arise from such possession, and these were
properly considered by the jury under the instructions
given.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the jury were properly
presented with the necessary facts to support the conviction of burglary in the second degree. It is submitted that the jury's determination of the facts presented, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom
should not be disturbed on appeal. This court need
only examine the record to see if there was sufficient
evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude as they did. Respondent submits that there is
such sufficient evidence.
Respondent further submits that the jury were
properly instructed on the law as it applies to this case.
Vicwiuo·
the instructions as a whole, they are clear,
/"_)
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concise, and complete and the jury being properly
instructed returned a verdict which clearly substantiates that they were satisfied that all of the necessary
elements of the crime were present. Respondent urges
that in view of this record and the facts found by the
jury, this court should affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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